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It is often said in relation to works of art that ‘close looking’ – or close attention 
to ‘the object’ – should have a privileged status. In the words of a recent Art Bulletin 
contributor: ‘I never feel more like an art historian than when, after a student has 
done her share of exhaustive research, has tried to interpret an artwork in light of 
all the readings I have assigned, I ask her to set that aside. “Just look,” I say. I ask her 
to base her observations on the way the artwork resists the context we can mobilize 
around it. Given what we know, what is different here from what we might expect?’1
This sort of thinking has had perhaps its most focused exploration in writing on 
modernism, where from Roger Fry through to Rosalind Krauss a critical tradition 
committed to close inspection of its objects, often called formalist or neo-formalist, 
has attempted to propose a method that minimizes or cuts out entirely the appeal 
to external, contextual, or associative factors. According to one supporter of this 
tradition, Charles Harrison, the best justifi cation for close attention to artworks is that 
certain works of art, resulting from ‘exceptional and intentional care’, ‘have a greater 
capacity than others to arbitrate what is and is not a valid description’.2 As such ‘it 
is this capacity in the work to arbitrate its own description that the artist deserving 
of the name tests for in the self-critical procedures of the practice’.3 ‘Harrison’, a 
sympathetic commentator notes, ‘claims that there is one point forcefully made by 
the writers of modernist criticism that deserves reiteration. That is that works of art 
are not necessarily interpretable by reference to social or historical events; they are 
events requiring interpretation in their own right.’4
In this essay I offer theoretical and practical refl ections on the operations involved 
in description and interpretation based on close looking, a corollary of the account 
being scepticism about taking claims like Harrison’s too literally. By ‘claims like’, as 
should become especially clear through the fi rst and second sections, I include those 
made as part of the phenomenological turn in image studies for the priority of direct 
or unmediated response to works of art.5 Sections on ‘Context and Disambiguation’, 
‘The Appeal to Intention’, and ‘Description and Redescription’ explore three main 
points: fi rst, however close the inspection of a work of art, a context of origin or 
reception must be used in order to disambiguate it; second, the typical and most 
secure form of disambiguation is not just an appeal to context of origin, but more 
narrowly to an attenuated form of intention; third, description based on ‘close 
looking’ tends to operate via ‘redescription’ of picked out qualities according to a 
particular context or set of contexts (and in the case of much modernist criticism, 
that rather than a rejection of context, the writer’s view of modernism itself functions 
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as such a context). Finally, I close with brief refl ections on the way that a governing 
context, such as modernism, is used to attribute a generalized form of personhood to 
those artists to which it is applied.
In relation to writing on modernism, one notion that emerges is this: that this 
kind of writing might be understood as projecting onto a set of artists a universalized 
underlying intention to ‘be modernist’, then relativizing the interpretation of 
their works to a stylistic and ideological context based on the relevant stage in the 
particular writer’s take on modernism and its unfolding. (This is not to deny that 
many writers on modernism are fully aware that ‘minimizing context’ in the name 
of close looking really means a shift of the contextual burden on to their views of 
modernism and its art history; it is, though, to say that the subtleties of that position 
have often been lost on readers, explicators, and followers.) 
More generally, interpretations based on ‘just looking’ (or on ‘form’, or 
‘structure’, or the ‘signifi er’) emerge in practice as yielding not exactly a closer 
relation to the ‘object’, but a kind of allegory structured by whatever context is, 
however implicitly, being brought to bear. ‘Modernist criticism’ would then be one 
special form of this allegorization, albeit an especially successful, infl uential and, 
according to some accounts defensible, one.
Context and Disambiguation
It is a familiar notion that pictures are deeply ambiguous. Art-historical examples 
range from simple decisions about representational matters much debated in the 
literature – is the item closest to us on the table in Parmigianino’s Portrait of a Collector 
(in the National Gallery, London) a rat or an antique statue; are there faces hidden in 
Dürer’s sketches of pillows (plate 1)? – to those ‘monstrously ambiguous’ works such 
as Giorgione’s Tempesta or Velasquez’s Las Meninas, where ever-proliferating scholarship 
leads to ever-less hope of agreement about what exactly is going on.6 
The issue can be presented in a radicalized manner through the idea of 
indiscernibles – of initially perceptually identical objects that when linked to 
different contexts yield dramatically different sets of properties. Take the short 
story by Jorge Luis Borges in which, in the early twentieth century, the character 
Pierre Menard produces a ‘new’ version of Don Quixote that is in fact identical word 
for word.7 In his text Borges is able to quote identical passages from the ‘two’ works 
and enumerate the striking differences between the earlier and later: the ‘crude’ 
becomes ‘subtle’; the ‘natural’ becomes ‘archaic’ and ‘affected’; the ‘merely rhetorical’ 
becomes ‘brazenly pragmatic’.8 At one point it is said that ‘The Cervantes text and the 
Menard text are verbally identical, but the second is almost infi nitely richer.’9 Inspired 
in part by this example, Arthur Danto’s imaginary exhibition of seven identical 
looking painted and framed red rectangles has presented the pictorial equivalent 
most succinctly. Knowing that one of these is a painting of ‘Israelites Crossing the 
Red Sea’, that one is of ‘Kierkegaard’s Mood’, one is a canvas primed by Giorgione on 
which a sacra conversazione was planned, and so on, leads to the realization by the viewer 
that each of these initially indiscernible red squares has entirely different sets of 
properties, representing and expressing different things, or being something we may 
not acknowledge as a work of art at all.10
Leaving aside Danto’s grander claims about the ontology of art, one lesson that 
has been drawn from this thought experiment is that fi xing what a particular work 
of art is taken to be is a highly context-specifi c matter – a case of a text or sound 
structure or physical object being indicated in a particular context.11 Determination 
of the features of a work of art, including what it represents, expresses, means, 
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and so forth, typically depends on an idea about the origin of that work.12 This 
determining origin can be roughly described as a ‘context of origin’, indicating a 
need for the information that the work was made by a particular person (or persons) 
at a particular time in a particular artistic context. More controversially, though 
undoubtedly often the case in practice, determination of the work can also depend on 
a ‘context of reception’, such as the particular gaze directed towards it or perspective 
from which it is looked at.13 Either way, use of such a context is the only way that 
ambiguity can be resolved. And because indiscernibles show that the features 
through which the work is disambiguated do not have to be immediately visually apparent, 
this means that works can in theory always be redescribed if a new construction of 
context of origin or reception is brought to bear.14 
This adds up to what we know is the case from experience – that the works 
best able to arbitrate their own description are simply the ones about which we 
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have the fi rmest agreement on the kinds of intention and context that fi x their 
identity. The Tempesta has often been held up as a prime example of an inherently 
ambiguous paining.15 But a key reason that it is so ambiguous is that we have so have 
little information about the place and time and context of the painting’s creation, 
including Giorgione’s intentions, those of the patrons, and those of contemporary 
scholarly or lay audiences. Later but eminently non-modernist paintings like Luke 
Fildes’ much-abused The Doctor are in fact far better able to arbitrate their own 
description (plate 2). But rather than a question of ‘exceptional and intentional care’ 
(following Harrison), or the quality of pictorial thought, the reason that such a work 
does not yield deep ambiguity is that we are pretty sure that we know how Fildes and 
most signifi cant contemporary audiences would have seen the work. Some of the 
most revered modernist works now edge close to the category of what James Elkins 
calls ‘monstrous ambiguity’, whereby the literature on them is so large that a whole 
term of a university course devoted to just one such work would be insuffi cient to 
cover it.16 The Doctor, on the other hand, is so ‘stable’ as a work that in art-critical and 
-historical articles it is only mentioned as an easy example rather than analysed as a 
problem, as if everything about it is eminently plain to see. It is more likely to be dealt 
with at length in medical journals than art-historical ones, and there talked about as 
an emblem for the profession, or as evidence for historical medical practices.17
At this point it may be obvious to art historians familiar with critiques of 
‘context’ that disambiguation via context of origin or reception means there are both 
horizontal and vertical paths to potentially unmanageable indeterminacy.18 In the fi rst 
case the kind of information that may be included in the construction of ‘originating 
context’ has no easily defi nable limit to its outward extension.19 And in the second, 
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the many conceivable reception-situations from the creation of the work right 
down to the present day mean a similarly open-ended proliferation of potentially 
determining ‘contexts’. 
As is understandable for an activity that claims to say historical things about its 
objects, art history has traditionally appealed to a version of originating context in 
order to establish the ‘historically accurate’ disambiguation of the work, and this in 
practice tends to reduce to a construction of the way that the original makers or users 
of the work would have seen or used the work. Many are happy to use ‘intention’ as a 
shorthand for this. But intention, as will be addressed further below, is an even more 
controversial term in art history than context. Whether acknowledging an embrace 
of intention or not, art historians have thus carefully worked up a set of vocabularies 
or rhetorical moves that allow them to circumvent this problem, in what I call the 
appeal to an attenuated form of intention. Something very like originating context or 
intentionality is regularly appealed to in order to disambiguate the work, but in a way 
that does not commit the writer to a belief in recoverable or conscious mental states 
determining the meaning of the work; talk of ‘intention’ is replaced by that of the 
posited ‘purposefulness’ that has constituted the ‘forward-leaning look’ of the object, 
by ‘networks of forms of likeness’ for the maker, or ‘forms of likeness that things 
have in a particular form of life’, by the vision, gaze, or not necessarily conscious 
experience of the maker, or even simply implied by the language of conscious artistic 
agency through which the interpretation is narrated.20
The unavoidability of some minimal notion of intention at this grounding level is 
demonstrated as clearly as anywhere in James Elkins’ book on ‘the origins of modern 
pictorial complexity’, from which my opening examples were drawn. Elkins does not 
discuss or appeal directly to intention in deciding the cases of ambiguity, but in every 
instance the decision about what the picture is ‘of’ reduces to how its maker would 
have seen it, so that distinctions are drawn between (proper intentionally grounded) 
‘seeing in’ and (merely viewer-generated) ‘reading in’, with the latter described as 
‘projecting’ or ‘hallucinating’.21 To put the point another way: how many art history 
books, however radical in rhetoric, have ever treated their subject matter as a series 
of origin-less found objects, and thus discussed works of art without any reference to 
the usually attributed creator and date of creation?22
The Appeal to Intention
An important aspect of the claim that there is typically an appeal to an attenuated 
form of intention to establish the identity of the work – to purposefulness, or vision, 
or the gaze, or not-fully-conscious intentionality – is brought into focus by the case 
of modernist criticism. For while some, such as Harrison and Michael Fried, have 
stressed the importance of artistic intention, they have at the same time maintained 
that close inspection of the works in question is the privileged route to its discovery.23 
And notoriously, other prominent writers on modernist art – including Clement 
Greenberg and Roger Fry – have allied their commitment to close looking with a 
more direct insistence that intention, at least at the conscious level found in artists’ 
own statements about their work, is irrelevant to a proper understanding of the art 
in question.24 ‘Formalists’, as W. J. T. Mitchell has put it, ‘think that meaning will take 
care of itself if we “subtract” extrinsic intention and let the language of the text work 
on us.’25
Nonetheless, as Mitchell’s reference to ‘extrinsic’ intention implies, strategies 
like the formalist one that privilege the experience had in the face of the work leave 
open the possibility that meaning found in this way can be classed as a truer kind of 
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(‘intrinsic’) intention. Amongst other places, the point is put especially directly in 
Stanley Cavell’s insistence that the work alone should tell a properly capable observer 
everything they need about intention, and so that ‘if we have earned the right to 
question it [about intention], the object will answer; otherwise not’.26 Whether the 
writer is Fry or Fried, then, this allows for an appeal to intention in order to establish 
the proper identity of the work, but with such intention found primarily ‘in’ the 
work through the critic’s own ‘close’ inspection. The ‘best possible’ interpretation of 
the work is taken over and above the conscious statements of the artist, and is then 
narrated in a manner – with the artist activated by being made the subject of the 
sentence or clause – that presents the thought as well as the action described by the 
critic as the artist’s own.27 Even where the relevance of intention is explicitly denied, 
the critic can nonetheless present the meaning they have discovered ‘in’ the work in 
strong terms of individual artistic agency.
The tactic is exemplifi ed in Rosalind Krauss’s essay ‘The Latin Class’, on Cy 
Twombly.28 There we read Krauss’s arguments about Twombly’s practice repeatedly 
narrated as if they indicate Twombly’s intent, or in Krauss’s words are ‘crucial 
to getting Twombly’s tone’.29 It is claimed, for example, that ‘he drew his own 
conclusions about the import of Abstract Expressionist gesture’; that ‘Twombly 
took up graffi ti as a way of interpreting the meaning of action painting’s mark’; that 
the connection with Jackson Pollock’s work is ‘a way of declaring how Pollock’s 
work should be read, at least in Twombly’s eyes’; that ‘he cannot write “Virgil” on a 
painting and mean it straight’; and even of an interpretation contrary to Krauss’s own 
that ‘It is this reading Twombly seems to protest with every means at his disposal’.30 
Then, revealing that Twombly’s own written and spoken words seem to contradict 
her interpretation, Krauss turns to an apparently anti-intentionalist stance: 
Do we care? To what degree do we have to respect Twombly’s self-assessment … 
To what degree is it our responsibility to make an independent reading of an 
artist’s work, acknowledging that while an artist may be a good interpreter of 
his or her own production, it does not follow that he or she will be its best one? 
No more than the analysand is the best reader of his or her dreams, motives, 
associations. To the contrary: The analysand is often the worst.31
What this hints at, while needing further elaboration, is the way that those advocates 
of modernist painting who are most apparently ‘for’ or ‘against’ intention, when 
arguing for the rightness of their own interpretation, in practice end up working 
according to the same basic principle. That is, the principle of the appeal to an 
attenuated form of intention – discovered primarily through close visual inspection – 
in order to disambiguate the work.
A way into the issue is offered by recent debates over intention and affect in the 
work of Henri Matisse, in particular as staged in a 2013 book by Todd Cronan, 
Against Affective Formalism.32 There Cronan takes aim at those he describes as ‘affective 
formalists’ among recent writers on Matisse, in particular: Gilles Deleuze; Yve-
Alain Bois; Rosalind Krauss; J. M. Bernstein; Alastair Wright; Éric Alliez; and Jean-
Claude Bonne. This mode of writing, for Cronan, is characterized throughout by the 
view that the artist developed a ‘surefi re “system” to produce violent sensations in 
the beholder’s body’, his works being ‘affective “machines”’ that directly transfer 
expressive content through their formal structure, thus obviating any kind of 
representational mediation.33 Instead, Cronan argues that:
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Matisse’s work suggests something other than fantasies of expressive 
communion or affective transfer. Contrary to what Matisse sometimes said 
about the transparency of expression or the immediacy of affect … his 
works refl ect on the problems of representing oneself to another, of how it 
is that a set of marks on a canvas or a sheet of paper can be understood or 
misunderstood, felt or rejected, by a beholder or even by oneself. Matisse 
came to feel that any work that did not open itself up to the possibility of 
failing to mean to another was a work that failed to mean at all … It is the 
discovery of the limits of and potentials for representation that is the primary 
content of his oeuvre.34
Despite Matisse’s nods to affect, Cronan concludes, his work ‘is better seen 
as a profound refl ection on the limits and powers of expression as a mode of 
understanding’. His work reveals ‘that to express oneself to another requires an 
acknowledgement of the other’s difference; this difference both threatens isolation 
and makes every connection like an unrepeatable gift’. To refuse this gift or to take it 
for granted – in the latter case to seek direct transmission of affects – ‘would involve a 
denial of the other and of oneself’.35
Foundational in the thought about Matisse that Cronan criticizes, as he at one 
point notes, is the writing of Yve-Alain Bois. In the work that forms the crux of 
Bois’s reading of Matisse’s painting as ‘blinding’, he focuses in particular on the years 
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between 1906 and 1911 during which Matisse ‘conclusively put in place’ his ‘system’, 
and in doing so defi nitively rejected the traditional conceptions of the decorative 
favoured by certain non-progressive contemporaries.36 As his patron’s support waned 
in the face of Matisse’s radicalism, Bois writes, Matisse ‘took a huge gamble’, and ‘as 
if he had nothing to lose’, carried ‘to the extreme’ the ‘decorative profusion that had 
characterized many of his works from the previous years’.37 Bois writes as follows of 
the two canvases that resulted:
Both Seville Still Life [c. 1910–11, now in the State Hermitage Museum, St 
Petersburg] and Spanish Still Life [plate 3] are diffi cult to behold – that is, the viewer 
cannot gaze at their pullulating arabesques and color fl ashes for very long. 
As had already happened in Le Bonheur de vivre, but now much more so, these 
paintings appear to spin before the eye; nothing there ever seems to come to 
rest. Flowers, fruits, and pots pop up like bubbles that dissolve into their busy, 
swirling background as quickly as one manages to isolate them. The centrality 
of the fi gure is dismantled: the viewer feels compelled to look at everything 
at once, at the whole visual fi eld, but at the same time feels forced to rely on 
peripheral vision to do so, at the expense of control over that very fi eld.38
Following on from the earlier development of ‘Matisse’s system’, this is what Bois 
calls Matisse’s ‘aesthetic of blinding’.39 It operates just as much, Bois writes, in an 
apparently simpler and calmer canvas such as Matisse’s Music of 1910 (now in the 
State Hermitage Museum, St Petersburg), for there the sheer size of the picture – ‘one 
hundred-plus feet of saturated colour’ – combines with the even distribution of 
fi gures to create an ‘aporia of perception’.40 The pull of the background colour leaves 
one unable to contemplate a single musician, while converse attention to the picture 
as a whole is disrupted by the ‘optical vibrations’ of the vermillion forms against the 
blue-and-green ground. Bois bases his analyses on the notion that fi gure and ground 
are ‘the very opposition on which human vision is based’, and that the way they 
annul each other in Matisse’s work – are ‘deliberately destabilized’ – means that ‘our 
vision ends up blurred, blinded by excess’.41 This fi gure/ground aspect is not just 
blinding, but also hypnotizing, ‘based on a pendulum in our perception that makes 
us switch from our incapacity to focus on the fi gures to that of seizing the whole 
visual fi eld at once, an oscillation that defi nes the very invention of Matisse’s concept 
of the “decorative”’.42 To give just one more of Bois’s analyses: 
in Interior with Eggplants [plate 4] … everything cooperates in leading us astray: 
the pulsating repetition of the fl ower motif that invades fl oor and walls 
and blurs their demarcation; the refl ection in the mirror that coloristically 
matches the landscape outside the window and confuses levels of reality; 
the syncopated rhythm and different scales of the ornamental fabrics; 
the gestures of the two sculptures (one on the table, the other on the 
mantelpiece) that rhyme with the arabesques of the folding screen. The three 
eggplants that give the painting its title are right in the middle of the canvas, 
but Matisse has blinded us to them and it is only through a conscious effort 
that we manage, only fl eetingly, to locate them.43
So what is so wrong with this kind of writing? Cronan is committed to a view of 
intentionality roughly derived from that of Walter Benn Michaels and Stephen 
Knapp’s 1982 paper ‘Against Theory’, and re-presented a number of times over the 
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years.44 According to this view, in order for us to interpret their meaning, works of 
art must be recognized as products of intention (which once discovered simply is 
their meaning). Refusing intention forces one to treat works as if they were objects 
like any other in the world rather than works of art made by a person or persons in a 
time and place, and leaves one able to appeal only to the subjective experience of the 
empirical viewer, which given its inherently personal nature is not something about 
which we can debate. At a number of points in his book Cronan makes clear that he 
equates the appeal to ‘affect’ with exactly this kind of experience of the empirical 
viewer.45 It is something that is within someone and simply a ‘fact’, that no one can 
reasonably confi rm or deny – no one can tell you that you have failed to experience 
yourself correctly – and thus something no one can argue about. This investment of 
the picture-as-object alone with agency naturally obviates what the artist themselves 
did, thought, and felt, and has as a result, for Cronan, nothing at all to do with art and 
its interpretation.
Where Knapp and Michaels were reticent, Cronan offers a detailed and highly 
sophisticated view of intention, pointing out that those who refuse it tend to base 
their critique on an impossibly simplistic construct of what intent might involve.46 
Perhaps most signifi cantly, given the standard complaints about intention, Cronan 
4 Henri Matisse, Interior 
with Aubergines, 1911. 
Distemper on canvas, 212 
× 246 cm. Grenoble: Musée 
de Grenoble. © Succession 
H. Matisse/DACS, London. 
Photo: Musée de Grenoble. 
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claims his account to be ‘antipsychological’ in a sense, for it is ‘not an appeal to artistic 
psychology, to fi guring out what is going on inside an artist’s head or heart’.47 Intention 
thus has nothing to do with a conscious mental plan in the mind that precedes the 
work – probably the most prevalent misrepresentation – nor is it to be equated with 
the artist’s conscious or articulated sense of the work’s meaning.48 Instead it is a 
mixture of conscious and unconscious aspects, formed in and during the creation of 
the work. Intentions emerge ‘in and through the process of production’, and largely 
come to be known once they have been ‘externalized for a beholder’ (which can 
include the artist as beholder of their own picture). This beholder can in turn ‘come 
to know him- or herself in the encounter with the work’.49
Analysis carried out on this basis is not a case of ‘fi nally or ultimately knowing’, 
of attaining a moment where ‘the intention is fully captured or recovered by the 
interpreter’.50 It is instead simply ‘to say that an artist meant something by his or 
her work, and that is what the art historian aims to understand by whatever means 
available’ – recovery of past meanings is ‘an ongoing challenge’ that ‘should not be 
forfeited on the grounds that one cannot have absolute certainty’. Its methodology 
is mixed, involving cautious usage of ‘writings, statements, interviews, documents’, 
and ‘biography’. But the ‘primary evidence’ in the readings of Matisse ‘are the visual 
characteristics of his work. And the characteristics that are relevant to my account are 
the ones I see as intended by the artist.’51
There are echoes of both Stanley Cavell and Richard Wollheim here, in the 
sense that intention is something that you can ultimately come to know through 
close inspection of the work itself, even in the most unlikely of cases. In Wollheim’s 
account, close in many respects to Cronan’s, the artist paints not just with the eyes, 
but for the eyes, at times acting as spectator of their own work, and imagining how 
a viewer of their work would respond.52 The effects of a work, in other words, are 
ones that the artist can be imagined to have experienced or intended themselves, 
as spectator of the work up until the moment it is done with. Thus Wollheim’s 
famous multiple hour sessions of close inspection of single works would yield up 
apparently highly unlikely results which could be safely taken as defi nitely intended 
properties of the work, dispensing with any caution about visual ambiguity or 
overdetermination in the viewer’s experience.53 Take his account of the realization 
that Manet’s paintings contained an internal spectator, where at the 1984 Manet 
exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art ‘time and time again, I discovered that 
I was engaging in imaginative enactments of a kind that might be expected to follow 
in the wake of my explicitly locating an internal spectator. Yet I had done no such 
thing. That being so, I trusted my eyes had not deceived me, and that the repertoire 
that I was following with such conviction was one for which my perception of the 
painting had given me some warrant: some implicit warrant, that is.’54
This take on intention places the texts of Bois and others like him in a very 
different light. Recall their quasi-objective claims about the perceptual effects that 
Matisse’s works have. If these were nothing more than ‘affect’ in Cronan’s terms, they 
would not be universalizable, but instead would have to be described as differing 
for each individual viewer. Think also that what Bois describes (or at least Cronan 
represents him describing) as ‘affects’, simply could not be the result of a context-
less object working on the nervous system of the viewer: the way that the ‘thing’ 
doing the affecting is described by these writers – by detailed reference to Matisse’s 
biography and writings, and as the product of ‘Matisse thought’, or the ‘Matisse 
system’ – makes it painfully clear that it has already been preconstituted as ‘a Matisse’. 
The object is securely disambiguated by the knowledge of its origins as a particular 
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‘work’ of art made by a particular artist in a cultural context, rather than just a found 
and context-less layer of oil and pigment.
What is happening here is that the effects are being described as the inevitable 
ones of looking at a Matisse, when seen as the particular cultural object that it is, created 
in a particular artistic context by a particular maker who would have seen it in a 
particular way. (Against the idea that affects are universal and inescapable, Bois and 
Wright note with evident disapproval that many have seen and still do see these 
works in ways that do not accord with their own readings, while Alliez and Bonn 
conclude that the logic of affect leaves viewers open to revel in their own responses, 
however personal.)55 The writers reject conscious and naïve constructs of intention. 
And in doing so they fall back on a looser construct which they may or may not call 
‘intention’ in theory, but which in practice leads them to work in a way that is importantly 
close to that of Cronan.56 Bois’s idea that the perceptual effects described are so 
fundamental is gained from a combination of biographical and written evidence 
from Matisse himself, and the overriding sense in front of the work that these are the 
right experiences to have.57 Implicit in that judgement, of course, is that those are the 
experiences Matisse would have had of the work. As Bois says elsewhere, ‘Matisse’s 
goal was not to represent the thing, but to represent the effect of the thing on him 
when he was painting it, and to create the same effect on the beholder.’58
Some call it intentionality and others anti-intentionality, then. But the tactic of 
depsychologized intention-as-hypothetical-construct, where a cautious approach 
is taken to biography and conscious statements, and the effects of the work are 
given priority, is in fact a shared feature of the writing of Cronan and Bois. Their 
disagreement – and whatever Cronan says about not being able to argue with Bois, 
he certainly does – is about the particular effects that the work has, the underlying 
intentions in the work that these refl ect, and the way that meaning should be 
constructed out of them. Disagreement, in other words, about how the work should 
be disambiguated –properly seen and experienced – based on how its originating 
context is understood. 
Description and Redescription
So much for intention.59 But what of the more general ideas of ‘context’ – whether 
original art-historical or cultural context, or later contexts of reception – of which 
intention is only really one component? I said earlier that one lesson of indiscernibles 
was that no matter what the immediately visible look of the work, the bringing 
to bear of a new context would always allow the work to be redescribed. If the 
features are not directly visible, the language of art writing is well equipped to 
redescribe them in a metaphorical or analogical way, a process that has been 
explained by various writers as one that is carried out by adopting a mode of 
(metaphorical) seeing-as (rather than seeing-in), by attention to non-visible 
likenesses (rather than visible ones), or by the application of artistic perception (as 
opposed to pictorial perception).60 What I want to show in this section is not what 
underlies ‘redescription’, however, but rather how this works in practice: the way that the 
introduction of a context can then allow the art writer to redescribe properties of 
the work in the service of a general description or interpretation, perhaps especially 
when that description is based on ‘close looking’.61 
An important side note to this is how such broadened contexts are subsequently 
recouped at the level of attenuated intention, as if the artist themselves would in some 
way have seen or experienced or ‘meant’ the work in the way that the redescription 
discovers. This is something like a rhetorical concertina effect, as the writing expands 
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outwards to propose an increasingly inclusive set of contexts relative to which the 
work is to be described, then retracts back to imply that the description and meaning 
generated were all along a function of the (far more secure) intention and origin that 
make the work of art what it really ‘is’.62
The process at work here can be seen in a recent article, ‘The Power of Looking: 
Teaching Students the Value of Deceleration and Immersive Attention’, based on 
a lecture given at the Harvard Initiative for Learning and Teaching conference in 
2013.63 As the subtitle suggests, the author, Jennifer L. Roberts, sets out to illustrate 
the value of focused attention to works of art, of slowing down, of ‘delay’. She 
approvingly quotes David Joselit’s suggestion that paintings are ‘time batteries, deep 
reservoirs of experience’, and describes the great value her students have found in the 
exercise in which she sends them to look at a single painting for three hours while 
taking notes on it. To illustrate the point, she relates that she carried out the exercise 
herself on John Singleton Copley’s Boy with a Squirrel (plate 5) as part of her research 
on a recent book, and that ‘it took me a long time to see some of the key details 
that eventually became central to my interpretation and my published work on the 
painting’.
5 John Singleton Copley, A Boy 
with a Flying Squirrel (Henry 
Pelham), 1765. Oil on canvas, 
77.15 × 63.82 cm. Boston: 
Museum of Fine Arts. Photo: 
Museum of Fine Arts.
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The unusual clarity of the account, given its origins in a didactic setting, allows 
for the abstraction of a basic recipe for putting together an interpretation grounded 
in close looking. Roberts’s interpretation proceeds from picking out pictorial details 
like the fi ngers spanning the water glass, to giving information about Copley’s having 
produced the painting to send to England. It then moves to a higher-level reading 
of the symbolizing of, and allusion to, questions of time and distance the described 
details involve, before suggesting an overall meaning for the painting as being ‘about 
its own patient passage through time and space’. The four general stages, which in 
practice can be carried out in a different order, and with different stresses, often 
so that one or other will only ever be implicitly dealt with, are: qualities; context; 
redescription; meaning.
Qualities1. . Pick out a selection of qualities of the object that appear signifi cant.
1b. Purposefulness. Attribute some kind of purposefulness to them (treating them as 
the product of an agent acting, from which we can make inferences about that 
action).
Context2. . Bring in, allude to, or have already implicitly established, a context 
(which can be anything from the kinds of socio-historical background most 
often associated with the word, to an abstract concept, a methodology, a later 
context of reception, or a general proposition about meaning in artworks of a 
particular type).
Redescription3. . Redescribe the qualities originally picked out in terms relevant to 
the context (through metaphor, metonym, synecdoche, and association to other 
works or things).
Meaning4. . Narrate the redescribed qualities to give a ‘meaning’ of the work.
This works in the example of Copley’s painting as follows:
Qualities are picked out.1. 
– After nine minutes it was noticed ‘that the shape of the boy’s ear precisely 
echoes that of the ruff along the squirrel’s belly’.
– After 21 minutes Roberts ‘registered the fact that the fi ngers holding the chain 
exactly span the diameter of the water glass beneath them’.
– After 45 minutes she ‘realized that the seemingly random folds and wrinkles 
in the background curtain are actually perfect copies of the shapes of the boy’s 
ear and eye’.
1b.  Purposefulness is attributed to the qualities.
– Along with the echo of boy’s ear and squirrel’s belly it was noticed that ‘Copley 
was making some kind of connection between the animal and the human body 
and the sensory capacities of each’.
– The echo of background curtain and boy’s ear and eye are ‘as if Copley had 
imagined those sensory organs distributing or imprinting themselves on the 
surface behind him’.
(In both cases here note the artist as subject of the sentence or clause: ‘Copley 
was making’; ‘as if Copley had imagined’.)
A context is established, based on details of Copley’s slow, long-distance 2. 
relationship with the London art world.
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– Copley was already successful in the United States but was keen to get 
feedback from the London art world.
– It was around eleven months before a letter was received in reply, informing 
him of the reception, and future correspondence continued at a similar pace.
The qualities picked out in the initial close looking are redescribed in terms 3. 
relevant to the context.
– The squirrel is a fl ying squirrel, as the belly indicates, ‘a species native to 
North America with obvious thematic resonances for the theme of travel 
and movement’, while ‘squirrels in painting and literature were commonly 
understood to be emblems of diligence and patience’.
– The glass of water and hand ‘evokes the passage of a sensory chain across 
a body of water and thereby presents in microcosm the plight or task of the 
painting itself’.
– The profi le format, ‘in the eighteenth century … was very strongly associated 
with persistence in time and space’. Profi les were usually seen on coins, and 
‘[i]n essence, a coin is a tool for transmitting value through space and time 
in the most stable possible way. Coins are technologies for spanning time 
and distance, and Copley borrows from these associations for a painting that 
attempts to do the same thing.’
The redescribed qualities are brought together to support a meaning.4. 
– ‘The painting is about its own patient passage through time and space … 
Copley’s painting, in other words, is an embodiment of the delays that it was 
created to endure.’
This is a clear illustration of the process whereby contexts are expanded 
outwards to enrich the reading of the work – from the moment of creation of 
the work, to Copley’s artistic context, to the London art world and transatlantic 
dialogue, and the reception of Copley’s work there – which is then secured 
as quasi-intentional. (In the more complex presentations that are usual in 
academic art-historical writing, the process seen here may be carried out a 
number of times, as a series of loops are made that select qualities, explicate a 
context, redescribe the qualities, select new qualities, and so on.)64 An opening 
suggestion that details picked out were later crucial to the interpretation does 
brief ly imply a view of ‘found’ details and ‘made’ interpretation, but Roberts’s 
text is predominantly couched in the language of recovery of historical 
meaning. While she is cautious and subtle in her claims, the interpretation 
is naturally to be taken as an historically grounded one – the meanings, 
associations, and such like that she suggests to her audience, are all also meant 
as if for Copley in the past, such that he may well at some level have seen or 
experienced the painting as, post-interpretation, we now should.
To some formalist or modernist critics the analysis in question might be rejected 
as a classic example of socio-historical or culturological contextual interpretation. 
Meaning, it might be claimed, is being made by drawing on a context brought from 
‘outside’. But this would entirely miss the point that there is no question of secure 
visual analysis without some idea of a context of origin or reception that will decide 
what the work really ‘is’. In this sense we are always dealing with preferred forms 
of what might constitute a disambiguating context, rather than any neatly internal/
external, text/context, situation.
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This can be seen in another, briefer, example, taken from a critic of exactly this 
kind of interpretation – who writes that ‘as important as these contextual analyses 
can be, in them the task of interpreting the meaning of the work itself often yields 
to accounting for its causes. The work of art is treated as a result of certain pressures, 
an effect of its context’s causing.’65 Dealing with Jackson Pollock, the art historian, 
Michael Schreyach, follows a similar line to Cronan in resisting the reduction of 
meaning to either causal explanations (including explicit artistic statements) or the 
affective responses of an empirical viewer. Instead his argument for an ‘intentionalist 
position’ is more or less identical to Cronan’s. He adds explicit nods to Wollheim 
and Charles Harrison, an acknowledgement of the ‘hypothetical’ nature of his 
construction of intention, and a by now familiar appeal to the perceptual effects of 
the work of art as the best way to get at intention.
Putting Schreyach’s interpretation of Pollock’s Number 1, 1949 (plate 6) into the 
schema outlined above, the fi rst stage proceeds as usual:
Qualities are picked out, as a set of perceptual effects are described 1. as qualities 
possessed by the work.
– It is diffi cult for a viewer to select from the surface any single pictorial 
incident that seems to impinge upon attention more than any other.
– But with the gaze fi xed at the centre, a relatively stable elliptical area appears, 
which counters the all-over quality of the surface.
1b.   Purposefulness is established.
– ‘This thwarting of visual equilibrium has implications for how we interpret 
the modes of experience or consciousness Pollock wants to express.’
Something more interesting happens, however, at the stage of adding context, 
for the writing moves directly from initially picked out qualities to a higher-level 
6 Jackson Pollock, Number 
1, 1949, 1949. Enamel and 
aluminium paint on canvas, 
160 × 264.2 cm. Los Angeles: 
Museum of Contemporary 
Art. © The Pollock-Krasner 
Foundation/ARS, NY/DACS, 
London. Photo: MOCA
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redescription of those aspects of the work. What is easily missed here is what has 
already been set up by the lengthy earlier part of the essay, as well as a footnote to 
Michael Fried’s ‘Shape as Form’ essay (one of the set of mid- to late-1960s texts that 
were foundational in the development of Fried’s ideas about modernist painting).66 
This indicates that:
the ‘context’ added by allusion is one of a particular view of modernist painting 2. 
and the kind of interpretation proper to it, deriving primarily from Fried and 
to a lesser extent Walter Benn Michaels and others. It involves two propositions 
crucial to what follows.
– One of the features of high modernist painting was its resistance to the literal 
shape of its material support, so that the painting operates as a work of art, 
rather than like any other object in the world. 
– The work of art – having successfully avoided reduction to mere object – is 
the product of an intention, and the dramatizing of its intentionality is one 
signifi cant feature of modernist painting.
The qualities of the work (the particular perceptual effects highlighted) are 3. 
redescribed in accordance with the context.
– ‘the internal framing of the ovoid provides a certain emergent structure to the 
image which restores to the painting a degree of pictorial cohesiveness that is 
more or less independent of both its perceived limits and the literal frame, as if 
the pictorial structure is now understood to be generated from the inside out, 
from the interior of the image to its frame, rather than the other way around, 
and creates a sense of the painting as a whole.’
– ‘the constitution of that totality – a structure that serves as a medium for 
expressive content, versus a merely literal shape – is to be understood itself as 
emergent from the fi gurative depth of the fi eld, not given beforehand.’
– ‘The total visual fi eld then, far from being an accumulation of marks that are 
taken as traces or indexes of [Pollock’s] movements or actions above the canvas, 
can be understood to be expressive of something like the subject’s emergence to 
the world, and of the freedom of his or her creative intentionality.’
A meaning is provided.4. 
– ‘On this account, Number 1, 1949 conveys something about the conditions of 
experience through which a refl ective subject might grasp the signifi cance of 
her embodied modes of intentionality – her own deep animating intentions.’
In both of these cases, whether description is through openly socio-historical 
interpretation or adopts an avowedly modernist and anti-contextual stance, the same 
basic structure is in operation. A small set of qualities are picked out and redescribed 
at a new level in accordance with a set of contexts, and attenuated intentionality 
is retrospectively recovered to secure the reading as an historical one. In the latter 
example the particular construction of what modernism as an artistic enterprise 
involved itself comes to function as a context.67 
Describing Objects, Making Modernists
Where does this all leave things? The account that I have offered is based on two main 
points:
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Intention of an attenuated kind is typically appealed to in order to establish 1. 
what a work is, and so the way it should be seen.
‘Close looking’ in practice operates via ‘redescription’ – picking out qualities 2. 
and redescribing them in terms of a context – and this tends to be folded back 
into the appeal to an attenuated form of intention. (Rather than standing for 
a disavowal of context, in this case, modernism itself can function as such a 
context.)
In closing, I would like to highlight something further that is brought into focus by 
the account of close looking offered here. Applying the analysis and the two points 
above to writing on modernism adds up to a further point: 
That a governing context brought to bear, such as modernism, functions in art 3. 
writing to attribute a generalized form of intentionality to the set of artists to 
which it is said to be relevant.
It is uncontroversial to say that the greatest modernist critics have been those with 
the most convincing and passionately defended constructions of what ‘modernism’ 
as a whole involves – a fact declared by the modernism-centred rather than work- or 
artist-specifi c nature of some of the most violent debates between them: ‘A View of 
Modernism’; ‘Using Language to do Business as Usual’; ‘Clement Greenberg’s Theory 
of Art’; ‘How Modernism Works’.68 Often it has been pointed out, too, that this results 
in ‘modernism’ for these writers becoming a separate volitional entity with its own 
intentional force.69
What is less clear, though, is the extent to which constructions of modernism are 
then mobilized as a context, and used to construct ideas of artistic purposefulness. 
This is no more than the necessary consequence of embracing the circularity 
that results from the pattern of intention-inference in play. The works that the 
understanding, committed, and true to their own response writer singles out are 
those works that compel conviction.70 In turn, the writer knows that, due to their 
‘internal’ take on intention, what they feel is there in the work is all they need in 
order to decide what was meant by it. (‘If we have earned the right to question it, 
the object itself will answer; otherwise not.’) The works are thus said to compel 
conviction because they are intentionally made to participate in the (modernist) 
tradition of artmaking favoured by the writer: they are described as if the artist 
intended their work to engage (in whatever way the critic deems suitable) with those 
works of the recent past that also (for the writer) compelled conviction. Close looking 
will of course play its part at this stage. But everything signifi cant about the work’s 
identity and the kind of attention that should govern its description has already 
been decided by the certainty that the artist set out to work in the given modernist 
tradition. Here is Rosalind Krauss on one of those artists she sees as the ‘Knights of 
the Medium’ providing the necessary continuation of modernism into the present 
day: ‘I think what I’m more interested in is stumbling on work that for one reason or 
another I recognize as genuine and then I try to understand where it comes from and 
what it is that secures the notion of it as authentic … I believed that the work of the 
Irish artist James Coleman is the real thing when I saw it. Outraged people weren’t 
saying “fake and phoney”, but the critical arguments for the work were themselves, 
I felt, fake and phoney. The defence of the work was made on grounds that I thought 
were irrelevant to the interest of the work. The grounds were national identity, 
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